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SUMMARY
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) extension of earlier partial equilibrium analyses of
static gains from regional economic integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in
Southern Africa. Both models are based on 37 sectors for each of 12 SADC countries. The most important
changes to the partial equilibrium version are:
· a simple mark-up cost function determining the cost of production of domestically produced goods,
· a market clearing exchange rate and tax wedge between income,
· expenditure that simulates fiscal policy aimed at maintaining full employment at the initial wage.
The CGE model is used to explore the welfare effects and the changes in employment structure of the agreed
SADC Free Trade Area (FTA). To highlight the deindustrialisation effects, these results are compared with Free
Trade (FT). The preliminary findings are that the FTA leads to some net trade creation. The manufacturing
sector suffers a marked decline under FT, particularly Textiles and Clothing whilst Mining employment is
stimulated. It is argued that the formulation of a SADC industrialisation strategy needs both the results of the
kind of CGE model discussed here, combined with sector studies and a political economy analysis.
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Wyck from the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa provided most of the database upon which this study
was based.
2ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper is a revised and extended version of Evans (1998a) with the CGE model reported in Evans (1998b,
1999a and b) replacing the partial equilibrium methodology of the earlier study. A number of persons have
provided assistance and advice. From the Institute of Development Studies, these persons include Raphie
Kaplinsky, Henry Lucas, Marie-Jo Cortijo and Adrian Wood. At the University of Sussex, Oxford University and
Lusaka, Peter Holmes, David Vines and Peter O'Brien, respectively, provided continuing support to the project.
Gerhard Kuhn, Gena Krasnik and Gerrit van Wyck from the Industrial Development Corporation of South
Africa assisted in the provision of much of the database upon which this study was based. I thank them all but
implicate none.
Instititute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
Falmer BN1 9RE, UK
Tel +44 1273 606261
Fax +44 1273 621202
Email davide@ids.ac.uk
3CONTENTS
Acronyms and Abbreviations 4
SADC Countries Included 4
SACU Countries within SADC 4
THE ARGUMENT 5
1 Regional Integration in Southern Africa 5
2 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 5
3 The Options 6
4 Methodology used in this Study 7
5 Deindustrialisation: What is it All About? 8
6 The Aggregate Effects of the FTA and FT on Welfare and Industrial Activity 8
7 The Effects of the FTA and FT on SADC Industrial Structure 10
8 Implications of the Findings for the Deindustrialisation Debate 11
9 Conclusions 12
Table 1: FTA Welfare and Employment Effects: % Change on Base 9
Table 2: FT Welfare and Employment Effects: % Change on Base 9
Table 3. SADC FTA and FT Employment Effects for 7 Sectors: % Change on Base 11
APPENDIX:  7 SECTOR RESULTS IN DETAIL 13
Table A.1. FTA 7 Sector disaggregated Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 13
Table A.1. Cont.: FTA 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 14
Table A.1. Cont.: FTA 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 15
Table A.1. Cont.: FTA 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 16
Table A.2. FT 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 17
Table A.2. Cont.: FT 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 18
Table A.2. Cont.: FT 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 19
Table A.2. Cont.: FT 7 Sector Industrialisation Effects: % Change on Base 20
References 21
4ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED
CGE Computable General Equilibrium
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CU Customs Union
EU European Union
FT Free Trade
FTA Free Trade Area
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ROW Rest of the World
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAPS Structural Adjustment Programs
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5T H E  A R G U M E N T
1  REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and its successor, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), had a strong anti-apartheid political orientation. Economic co-
operation was based on a sectoral approach. The Windhoek Treaty of 1992 changed the basis of economic co-
operation to allow for 'efficiency, economy and competitiveness'. This shift led to the SADC Protocol on Trade
Co-operation (SADC, 1996) for the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA). Currently, moves are already
beginning for the formation of a Customs Union (CU) out of the FTA. The SADC FTA is but one of several
regional moves towards greater economic integration, principally from the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Cross-Boarder Initiative2. There are also a variety of bilateral agreements
between regional partners, or between regional partners and international partners such as the European Union
(EU).
Alongside the various moves towards regional integration, the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPS) have operated on a unilateral basis, one dimension of which has been trade policy reform. Together with
the moves to form the SADC FTA, the SAPS programmes have been dominant in regional trade policy for
much of the 1990s. It is the contrasting moves towards trade policy liberalisation, via regional integration or via
unilateral trade policy reform, which have provided much of the focus of the industrial strategy debate in
Southern Africa. The central question addressed in this chapter is: will a continuation of the SAPS route to the ultimate
conclusion of unilateral Free Trade or FT lead to deindustrialisation of Southern Africa compared with regional integration through
an FTA?
2  TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION
At the heart of the analysis of regional integration is the concept of trade creation and trade diversion. Terms of
trade effects are also potentially important. Thus, regional integration through tariff variation has a total trade
effect that is the sum of trade diversion and trade creation, less any loss of income through adverse terms of
trade effects arising from the overall expansion of trade. In essence,
· Trade creation occurs when an economic union leads to the growth of intra union trade that exploits
comparative advantage i.e. when the union members experiencing expanded trade have lower relative costs
compared with the rest of the world (ROW) suppliers.
· Trade diversion takes place when an economic union leads to an expansion in intra union trade in which
the relative costs are higher than for competitor countries in the rest of the world. That is, where the
expanded intra-union trade is against comparative advantage.
                                               
1  Much of the background material to this paper can be found in Evans (1996, 1997, 1998a and b), Mandaza et al 1998.
2  The Cross-Boarder Initiative is discussed in (ADB et al 1992).
6It follows from the above that an economic union improves members' welfare when trade creation outweighs
trade diversion. This statement is qualified when the trade expansion worsens the terms of trade of members of
the economic union. In which case, the union could lower welfare, even when trade creation outweighs trade
diversion. A further qualification can be added. A customs union (CU) that is predominantly trade diverting can,
by appropriate choice of the common external tariff, be transformed into a gainful and predominantly trade
creating customs union.
Within the industrialisation debate, the rationale for concern over the effects of regional integration on the
size of the industrial sector is both varied and imprecise. In this chapter, no particular stand is taken on these
issues. Rather, the estimated impact of different types of regional integration is shown alongside the more
standard welfare indicators.
3  THE OPTIONS
In principle, there are three basic options to consider:
· Free Trade Area (FTA). This applies when existing tariff structures applicable to non-member countries
or the ROW are maintained as SADC moves towards FT within the group. Typically, rules of origin have to
be applied to a FTA to prevent importation through the country with the lowest tariff for a particular sector.
· Customs Union (CU). The central difference between a CU and a FTA is that the CU has a common
external tariff, thus dispensing with the need for rules of origin.
· Open Regionalism (OR). This may be just freer Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade or it may have the
ultimate objective of FT. It envisages a bargaining process concentrating initially on co-ordinated MFN
trade policy reforms amongst the key member states.
It is important to note that a SADC FTA is critically dependent upon the successful operation of the rules of
origin, whereby imports into a member state cannot be trans-shipped through another to realise the benefits of
the lowest external tariff for a particular product within the FTA. However, it is likely that the administrative
capacity of SADC customs authorities will be very weak. It is therefore unlikely that the rules of origin will be
enforceable. If this observation is correct, then a SADC FTA will operate more or less as a CU in which the
common external tariff is formed by the lowest tariff on each commodity in each of the member states of the
proposed FTA. For simplicity this is called the CUmin. It is perhaps for this reason that just as ratification of the
SADC FTA is about to be completed, moves are being made for a move on to a SADC CU. Thus, there are
really two FTAs. The 'intended' FTA is interpreted as if the rules of origin could be strictly enforced without
cost. The 'real' FTA with unenforceable rules of origin will be very much the same as the CUmin that resulted
from the application of the minimum tariff on any item as the common external tariff for that item. A CUmin
would in fact have a low external tariff, an obvious advantage for minimising trade diversion. In the SADC
context, FT without co-ordination or negotiation with trading partners is the logical outcome of a trade policy
reform process under World Bank SAPs or under the WTO. It is therefore appropriate to develop an analytical
framework within which each of the options discussed can be modelled. This facilitates the analysis of the
effects of each form of regional integration on the size and composition of the industrial sector.
74  METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS STUDY
My initial work on the impact of the SADC Free Trade Area FTA for SADC (Evans (1996, 1997)) relied on a
simple partial equilibrium model and weak data set. The data set was greatly improved in Evans (1998a), but the
earlier partial equilibrium methodology was retained. An extension to a Computable General Equilibrium or
CGE framework was reported in Evans (1998b), and is also used in this study. The additional data requirements
for the CGE version of the model, over and above the partial equilibrium version, were mainly on the demand
side, and input/output coefficients. Whilst these data were assembled using strong assumptions, the main
structural differences between SADC countries were preserved. Thus, it was judged that the extended data set
was adequate for a first general equilibrium exploration of SADC integration.
Over-all, the CGE model is based on 12 SADC countries and 37 productive sectors for each country.
There were 9 agricultural sectors, a mining sector, one non-traded service sector, and 26 manufacturing and
mining sectors. The production and trade data are for the early to mid 1990s, and the tariff data are for the most
recent year available. The database is described in Evans (1998a and 1999c forthcoming).
Some of the key assumptions and structural characteristics built into the general equilibrium model include:
· Armington functions on the import side where the share of imports in total supply of a tradable good is
inversely related to the price of imports relative to the price of domestic production. Similarly, imports from
within the SADC region and from the ROW are treated as imperfectly substitutable and responsive to
relative price changes. It is therefore possible to use the Armington functions to construct a composite
import commodity made up of imports from within SADC and from the ROW, and for this composite
import to be imperfectly substitutable with import competing production. The composite importable
commodity enters into domestic demand in a straightforward manner.
· Perfectly elastic supply of goods in each sector. Where there is excess capacity, both micro assumptions are
likely to be good approximations. For agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors operating close to full
capacity, the supply response is likely to be exaggerated in a relative sense compared with what it would be
with supply constraints being modelled.
· A mark-up model of domestic cost formation. The mark-up is on wages and intermediate input costs. The
model assumes fixed coefficients in production for labour, as well as the more usual assumption of fixed
proportions for intermediate inputs.
· A macro expenditure adjustment is made to maintain a full employment level at the initial constant wage.
Balance of payments equilibrium is maintained via variation of the real exchange rate.
· Government expenditure and investment was held constant, whilst consumer demand and intermediate
demand varied through price and income change.
· A micro-based welfare function was constructed, based on an estimate of the consumer surplus change net
of estimated intermediate demand less the loss of tariff revenue and the lump sum tax or subsidy required to
maintain macro economic balance.
8· An attempt was made to estimate SADC price elasticities of demand for exports to the ROW. This exercise
was entirely unsatisfactory. Given the underlying weakness of these data, sensitivity tests were carried out in
Evans (1998b, 1999b forthcoming). Here, only calculations for 'high' export demand elasticities were used.
· Solution of the model was achieved with a Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure.
5  DEINDUSTRIALISATION: WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT?
Broadly speaking, the deindustrialisation thesis suggests that the removal of trade policy instruments in a
developing economy will have an adverse effect on industrial output and employment, thereby prematurely
truncating the process of industrialisation. The idea that the industrialisation process is truncated by trade policy
reform arises from the suggestion that an important historical role of the trade policy instruments was to select
industries for some kind of infant industry protection. This is not the place to enter into the debate on the
efficacy of the selection process. Rather, the aim is to have a first look at the impact of trade policy reform on
both economic welfare and the size and composition of the industrial sector.
In the Southern African context, the empirical dimension of the deindustrialisation issue is complicated by
two considerations. First, there was some unilateral trade policy reform from the early 1990s through SAPS
agreements with the World Bank and through the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This period of unilateral
trade policy reform has given way to the multilateral reforms under the SADC agreement to introduce a FTA in
1996, now in its final stages of ratification. Empirically, it would have been desirable to trace first the effect of
the various unilateral reforms on SADC countries, and then to assess the potential impact of the FTA, a CU and
FT. However, the tariff database was for the most recent year in each of the SADC countries, so the empirical
experiments only relate to the potential impacts of the FTA, a CU and FT. As already argued, since the
'intended' FTA to be modelled has unenforceable rules of origin and would, in practice, be much the same as the
CUmin. This effectively means that the 'intended' FTA calculations are redundant. Furthermore, the model
estimates with the CUmin are similar to FT. In these circumstances, the compromise made was to examine the
model results for the 'intended' FTA, and an approximate 'CU' or 'FT' situation, captured by the potential FT
results. The estimated aggregate welfare and industrialisation effects for the 'intended' FTA and FT are shown in
the next section.
6  THE AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF THE FTA AND FT ON WELFARE AND
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY
In Table 1 below, the aggregate welfare and industrialisation effects are shown for all SADC. In welfare terms,
measured by changes in consumer surplus, the impact of the 'intended' FTA is quite modest in % terms, being
0.11% of the initial Final Demand. However, in absolute terms, the estimated gains are very substantial at
$US1500m in 1991-93 prices. The raw numbers of employed persons actually falls slightly, reflecting an implicit
rise in the average wage for all SADC since it is employment in wage units which is held constant.
9Table 1 :  FTA Welfare and Employment Effects:  % Change on Base
Large Export  Elast ic i t ies ,  Market Clear ing Taxes and Subsidy
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC %  L %  L %  L
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports All Indust. Manuf.
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 10.8 6974 28.4 -34.1 14.7 8.9 0.13 0.999 20.2 -0.09 -0.38 -1.30
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 11.8 3386 13.1 -8.2 -10.1 -5.2 -0.15 1.001 0.2 0.23 2.30 3.55
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 11.7 1279 15.4 -13.0 2.7 5.1 0.39 0.999 0.4 -0.15 6.61 10.32
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 20.6 1886 72.3 -44.9 26.0 53.4 2.83 0.999 22.7 -0.04 1.97 1.99
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 22.7 2525 67.5 -38.3 -21.3 8.0 0.32 1.004 25.0 -0.90 -4.11 -4.11
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 12.0 1589 66.1 -59.7 6.8 13.1 0.83 0.989 19.0 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 12.6 1959 1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.03 1.000 0.1 0.07 -0.24 -0.19
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 5.6 108822 108.2 -87.7 -6.6 13.9 0.01 1.001 20.8 -0.03 -0.13 0.00
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 6.3 1035 3.1 -0.5 1.3 4.0 0.38 1.003 0.3 -0.11 -0.57 -0.60
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 19.0 3315 7.0 -5.8 1.0 2.2 0.07 1.000 33.6 0.01 0.25 0.40
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 11.4 1898 14.6 -48.3 2.0 -31.7 -1.67 0.998 18.8 -0.63 -0.97 -2.07
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 15.8 4240 118.9 -94.0 56.0 80.9 1.91 0.979 32.5 -0.21 3.16 4.41
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 9.3 138909 516 -435 72 152 0.11 0.999 9.4 -0.07 0.02 0.12
Notes: $USm average 1991-3 for financial variables; '000 for employment; Government revenue excludes grants; Imports and exports
valued cif; Average tariff import weighted; ToT: Terms of Trade, average price exports/average price imports; L: Labour employed
A feature of the overall welfare and employment results for the 'intended' FTA is the marked unevenness of the
changes. In the case of the of measured welfare changes, three out of 12 countries actually show a decline in
measured welfare, namely Botswana and Namibia from the Southern African Development Community (SACU)
and Zambia. For the employment effects, the unevenness of the impact is greater, with 7 out of 12 countries
showing negative effects. The overall industrial and manufacturing employment changes have much larger
orders of magnitude with 6 out of 12 countries showing gains. It is striking that the overall and industrial
employment effects in each country do not correlate. To the extent that wage differentials capture skill
differentials, the rise or fall in overall employment provides an indicator of changes in the skill composition of
total output. It is apparent that the rise or fall in the level of employment does not correlate with the gains and
losses for each country in moving to the 'intended' FTA. That is, there is no particular pattern of skill-based
comparative advantage revealed by the results.
Table 2:  FT Welfare and Employment Effects:  % Change on Base
Large Export  Elast ic i t ies ,  Market  Clear ing Taxes and Subsidies
      SADC tariffs                ROW tariff Final Consumer Customs Lump Sum TOTAL %  Final ToT % SADC %  L %  L %  L
pre  post pre post Demand Surplus Revenue Tax GAINS Demand Pe/Pm Imports All Indust. Manuf.
Angola 10.1 0.0 10.8 0.0 6974 233.5 -196.0 107.7 145.2 2.08 0.998 9.5 -0.65 -1.73 -6.26
Botswana 0.5 0.0 11.8 0.0 3386 77.4 -38.8 5.0 43.6 1.29 1.012 -0.5 0.53 4.98 7.11
Lesotho 1.5 0.0 11.7 0.0 1279 24.9 -23.1 3.5 5.3 0.41 1.002 -0.6 -0.45 3.37 5.55
Malawi 21.8 0.0 20.6 0.0 1886 163.4 -99.8 65.4 129.0 6.84 0.996 16.4 0.09 -0.57 -0.57
Mauritius 24.5 0.0 22.7 0.0 2525 358.5 -363.6 12.6 7.5 0.30 0.981 20.1 -0.11 -10.79 -10.82
Mozambique 19.5 0.0 12.0 0.0 1589 136.6 -117.4 15.6 34.8 2.19 0.976 16.3 0.43 0.51 0.39
Namibia 0.1 0.0 12.6 0.0 1959 34.1 -17.0 5.5 22.7 1.16 1.009 -0.4 -0.78 -7.94 -13.04
RSA 6.5 0.0 5.6 0.0 108822 630.7 -775.2 287.2 142.6 0.13 0.989 14.2 0.05 0.04 -1.84
Swaziland 0.1 0.0 6.3 0.0 1035 8.6 -3.5 -0.5 4.5 0.44 1.007 1.0 0.01 -1.93 -2.10
Tanzania 21.9 0.0 19.0 0.0 3315 263.9 -211.8 23.1 75.2 2.27 0.975 19.2 0.39 5.30 7.36
Zambia 14.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 1898 205.5 -98.1 49.5 156.9 8.26 0.999 17.8 -0.99 -1.39 -3.80
Zimbabwe 18.8 0.0 15.8 0.0 4240 315.4 -273.6 67.7 109.5 2.58 0.956 23.0 0.30 1.58 1.54
SADC 5.7 0.0 9.3 0.0 138909 2452 -2218 642 877 0.63 0.991 6.5 -0.07 -0.04 -1.49
Notes: $USm average 1991-3 for financial variables; '000 for employment; Government revenue excludes grants; Imports and exports
valued cif; Average tariff import weighted; ToT: Terms of Trade, average price exports/average price imports; L: Labour employed
In the case of the FT case, the estimated welfare effects dramatically increase to 0.63%. The absolute amount of
the gain is $US87500m in 1991-3 prices is very large. These initial effects of FT suggest that the World Bank,
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and standard neo-classical view, on the benefits of trade policy reform is correct. That is, there are substantial
welfare gains to be reaped in SADC from FT. The country pattern of the overall employment change, and
therefore implied skill-mix change, is quite different from that under the 'intended' FTA. However, the fact that
the relative increase in SADC trade is substantial in both the 'intended' FTA and under FT suggests that the bulk
of the increase in intra-SADC trade under the 'intended' FTA may be trade creating and not trade diverting. This
point will be developed in the next section.
There is one important qualification to the FT results. Kaplinsky (1998) suggests that terms of trade effects
have been important for the later developing East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries or NICs. The more
mature East Asian NICs have been better able to offset any adverse terms of trade effects by constantly
increasing the value-added content of their exports. In the case of SADC, the full open economy approach to
industrialisation could run into similar terms of trade effects in crowded manufactured export markets if
industrialisation for exports concentrates on the lower end of the quality range. Also, exports of primary
commodities are higher in SADC than for in East Asia, so that adverse terms of trade effects could arise from
the export of primary commodities as well. Ideally, it would be useful to illustrate this possibility by starting from
empirical estimates of the elasticity of demand for SADC exports, and including these estimates in the export
demand functions. Perhaps not surprisingly, the quest for empirical estimates of SADC export demand
elasticities proved fruitless. However, the FTA and FT results for 'large' export elasticities can be compared with
those for 'low' elasticities. The comparison of the two sets of results gives some idea of the sensitivity of the
results to the export elasticity assumptions. In the case of the 'intended' FTA, the change in the export elasticity
assumption has little impact on the overall welfare effects. However, in the FT case, the 'low' export elasticity
assumption dramatically cut the gains from FT. This finding suggests that FT without a significant capacity to
constantly upgrade products may have significant adverse terms of trade effects.
It is noteworthy that both the 'intended' FTA and FT lead to a substantial increase in intra-SADC trade.
This suggests that the excluded dynamic effects that may arise from the 'intended' FTA or under FT may be
significant. Possible dynamic effects include scale economies that may arise even when the scale effects are
relatively small but can bring relatively big further specialisation gains, including the better use of infrastructure.
Also excluded are the effects of the reinvestment of initial gains. As argued in Mandaza et al. (1998, Table 4 and
discussion), inclusion of these dynamic effects could plausibly increase the size of the estimated benefits of the
FTA estimated by around 4-6 times. A similar multiplier might be applied to the FT case since the dynamic
benefits coverall of tradables and not just intra-SADC trade.
7  THE EFFECTS OF THE FTA AND FT ON SADC INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
Another way of looking at the industrialisation effects of the 'intended' FTA and FT is to look at the SADC-
wide sectoral changes of employment. At the 37-sector level, the estimated changes in output, employment and
wage unit measures are all the same in % terms because of the fixed proportions assumption. It is only when the
% changes are aggregated that the results differ because the sector weight for each variable is different.
Employment changes appropriately weighted are shown in Table 3 below for a 7-sector and a 4-sector
aggregation of the model results.
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Table 3:  SADC FTA and FT Employment Effects for 7 Sectors:  % Change on Base
Large Export  Elast ic i t ies ,  Market  Clear ing Taxes and Subsidies
  7 Sectors            4 Sectors
Sectors L FTA % FT % Sectors L FTA % FT %
Agriculture 7420 -0.14 -0.07 Agriculture 7420 -0.14 -0.07
Mining 1130 -0.19 3.22 Mining 1130 -0.19 3.22
Food, tobacco, beverages 556 -0.44 0.01
Textiles 254 0.70 -9.58 Manufacturing 2530 0.12 -1.49
Clothing 251 0.81 -4.31
Other manufactures 1468 0.11 -0.17
Services 8821 -0.05 -0.09 Services 8821 -0.05 -0.09
Total or Average 19902 -0.071 -0.075 Total or Average 19902 -0.071 -0.075
Notes: '000 for employment; L: Labour employed
The pattern of the results shown in Table 3 is clear. Generally, Mining performs better under FT than under the
'intended' FTA. Of the manufacturing sectors identified, only Food, Tobacco and Beverages follow the pattern
of Mining. The rest of the manufacturing sector shows an increase in employment under the 'intended' FTA and
a decline in employment under FT. Focus on the Manufacturing sector alone suggests that there is also trade
diversion under the FTA, particularly for Textiles and Clothing. However, the overall results suggest that there
is, on balance, trade creation. This is reflected in the same sign of the employment change for the two sectors
with the highest initial employment, namely Agriculture and Services. Although the changes in employment in
these sectors are small in % terms, both Agriculture and Services are large employers, dominating the trade
diverting effects in Mining and Manufacturing. Thus, the changes in resource allocation under the FTA would
appear, on balance, to be trade creating, not trade diverting. However, a more careful analysis of trade creation
and trade diversion using the full 37 sector results is needed before a more definitive answer on trade creation
and trade diversion can be reached.
8  IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE DEINDUSTRIALISATION
DEBATE
If deindustrialisation focuses only on the manufacturing sector, then it is clear that the move from the 'intended'
FTA to FT will induce some deindustrialisation. When Mining is included, there is a powerful offset to this
conclusion. Of the 4 manufacturing sectors identified, strongest deindustrialisation is in Textiles and Clothing.
Should this be of concern, given that the effects identified are small in % terms? The answer to this question is
both 'yes' and 'no'. The 'yes' part of the answer is that the model is static and excludes non-tariff barriers and
dynamic influences. It is hard to judge how consideration of the Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) would affect the
answer. Only if the incidence of NTBs correlates with the height of tariffs would the pattern of the results be
the same. However, in the case of dynamic effects, it is likely that the full dynamic effects would increase the
orders of magnitude employment effects observed, but the patterns of change may well remain similar. Thus,
the decline in Textiles and Clothing is of concern principally as an adjustment issue were FT to be implemented,
an issue that does not arise under the 'intended' FTA. The 'no' part of the answer is that FT forces SADC to
focus on comparative advantage, to weed out the last of the inefficient manufacturing sectors, and to take steps
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to ensure that exporters have the capacity to upgrade their products to avoid terms of trade problems. Also,
shifting the focus of industrialisation to linkages around Agriculture, Mining and Services has some merit.
9  CONCLUSIONS
In the end, a final view on the best strategy for industrialisation in SADC, around the 'intended' FTA, FT or a
CUmin, which has not been analysed here, depends on a good deal more information than assembled in this
paper. First, there is the more disaggregated view of the model results that can be obtained using the full 37
sectors. Second, an analysis of industrial effects of the CUmin is important because it avoids the worst of the
potential terms of trade effects that may arise under FT. Third, I have emphasised the preliminary nature of the
CGE modelling exercise. There will be high pay-off to further development of economic policy modelling of the
Southern African region, first, with improved and more recent data, second, with labour force and household
disaggregation, and third, with a better treatment of capital. Finally, such work can only complement both case
studies and political economy research on micro and institutional aspects of the path toward regional integration.
APPENDIX:   7 SECTOR RESULTS IN DETAIL
Table A.1 :  FTA 7 Sector Disaggregated Industr ial isat ion Effects:  % Change on Base
Large Export  Elast ic i t ies ,  Market Clear ing Taxes and Subsidies
Table A.1.  Cont. :  FTA 7 Sector  Industrial isat ion Effects:  % Change on Base
Table A.1.  Cont. :  FTA 7 Sector  Industrial isat ion Effects:  % Change on Base
Table A.1.  Cont. :  FTA 7 Sector  Industrial isat ion Effects:  % Change on Base
Notes: $USm average 1990-2 for financial variables; Government revenue excludes grants; '000' for employment Imports and exports valued fob; Average tariff uses
import weights; D: Domestic demand;
SM: Import competing production; MS: imports from SADC; MR: Imports from the Rest of the World; ES: Exports to SADC; ER: Exports to the Rest of the World;
dBOP: change in Balance of Payments;
L: Labour employed; CR: Customs Revenue; GR: Government Revenue; tMS1 ,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted; tMS2,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import
weighted, final;  tMR1,M: Tariffs, SADC,
initial, import weighted, R: Rest of the World.
Table A.2 :  FT 7 Sector Industrial isation Effects:  % Change on Base
Large Export  Elast ic i t ies ,  Market Clear ing Taxes and Subsidies
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import weights; D: Domestic demand;
SM: Import competing production; MS: imports from SADC; MR: Imports from the Rest of the World; ES: Exports to SADC; ER: Exports to the Rest of the World;
dBOP: change in Balance of Payments;
L: Labour employed; CR: Customs Revenue; GR: Government Revenue; tMS1 ,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted; tMS2,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import
weighted, final;  tMR1,M: Tariffs, SADC, initial, import weighted, R: Rest of the World.
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